In this paper we apply some new and some old methods in order to construct classical and intuitionistic models for theories of bounded arithmetic. We use these models to obtain proof theoretic consequences. In particular, we construct an ω-chain of models of BASIC such that the union of its worlds satisfies S 1 2 but none of its worlds satisfies the sentence ∀x∃y(x = 0 ∨ x = y + 1). Interpreting this chain as a Kripke model shows that double negation of the above mentioned sentence is not provable in the intuitionistic theory of BASIC plus polynomial induction on coNP formulas.
Introduction and Some Backgrounds
In this paper we are concerned with some well known classical and intuitionistic theories of bounded arithmetic such as S 1 2 and IS 1 2 (see [B1] and [B3] ). The language of these theories extends the usual language of arithmetic by adding the function symbols rounded down to the nearest integer), |x| (= the length of binary representation for x) and # (x#y = 2 |x||y| ). These symbols have clear computational meanings (see [B1] ). We also work with a richer language introduced by Stephen Cook containing function symbols for polynomial time computable functions, and with theories such as IPV in this language (see [CU] ). This paper can be considered as a companion to our earlier works [M1] and [M2] , but can be read independently. In particular, our results were not based on [M2] .
Below, we give some general information concerning the theories mentioned above.
BASIC is a finite set of quantifier-free formulas expressing basic properties of the relation and function symbols.
A sharply bounded formula is a bounded formula in which all quantifiers are sharply bounded, i.e. of the form ∃x |t| or ∀x |t| where t is a term which does not contain x. and '→'. This theory was introduced and studied by Cook and Urquhart and by Buss (see [CU] and [B3] ). A function f is also defined to be Σ b+ 1 -definable in IS 1 2 if it is provably total in IS 1 2 with a Σ b+ 1 formula defining the graph of f . In [CU] it is proved that f is Σ [CU] , see also [A] for a different proof.
The theory PV is Stephen Cook's equational theory for polynomial time functions and PV 1 is its (conservative) extension to classical first-order logic. PV 1 is a universal theory which proves the polynomial induction on quantifier-free formulas. PV i denotes the intuitionistic deductive closure of PV. IPV is the intuitionistic theory of PV plus polynomial induction on NP formulas. Here, an NP formula is a quantifier free formula (in the language of PV) prefixed by a block of bounded existential quantifiers. IPV is a conservative extension of IS In Section 4, we give more exact results in this direction. The following related results are also proved in [M1] . (
Is is known that, CPV = PV 1 implies the collapse of the polynomial hierarchy (see [KPT] ).
In the last section we will consider the question of whether PV + PIND(coNP) i PIND(NP). We will give a negative answer to this question based on a plausible assumption.
Basic results on Kripke models of intuitionistic bounded arithmetic
In this section we briefly describe Kripke models. All theories we will study prove the principle of excluded middle PEM (that is, ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ) for atomic formulas and so we can use a slightly simpler version of the definition of Kripke models as we have completeness with respect to this restricted class of models (see [B2] ).
A Kripke structure K for a language L can be considered as a set of classical structures for L partially ordered by the relation substructure. We can assume, without loss of generality, that this partially ordered set is a rooted tree. For every node α, L α denotes the expansion of L by adding constants for elements of M α . The forcing relation is defined between nodes and L α -sentences inductively as follows:
• For atomic ϕ, M α ϕ if and only if M α ϕ;
• M α ϕ ∧ ψ if and only if M α ϕ and M α ψ;
• M α ϕ → ψ if and only if for all β ≥ α, M β ϕ implies M β ψ;
• M α ∀xϕ(x) if and only if for all β ≥ α and all a ∈ M β , M β ϕ(a); and
A Kripke model K forces a formula ϕ(x), if each of its nodes (equivalently its root) forces ∀xϕ(x). A Kripke model is T-normal, where T is a set of sentences, if each node (world) of it satisfies T. It decides quantifier free formulas if it forces the axiom PEM restricted to quantifier free formulas. So, for example, any BASIC-normal Kripke model decides atomic formulas (see [B3] ).
Below, we mention some facts about Kripke models of bounded arithmetic theories (see [M1] ). (ii) For a Kripke model of PV i over the frame ω to force PIND(coNP) it is necessary and sufficient that the union of the worlds in it satisfies CPV.
Proof. By induction on the complexity of formulas it is easy to see that for each ∃-free formula A, each node in such a Kripke model forces A if and only the union of the worlds above it satisfies A. Now apply the definition of forcing.
Constructing models of bounded arithmetic
In this section we introduce some methods for constructing models for classical and intutionistic bounded arithmetic. First the classical one. This is indeed a variant of the construction given in Johannsen [J1-J2] , where a model of the theory S 0 2 (the classical theory axiomatized by BASIC plus PIND on sharply bounded formulas) was constructed to witness a well-known independence result of Takeuti [Ta] , i.e. S Recall that, the axiom exp states that the exponentiation function is total, and the axiom Ω 2 states that the function x# 3 y = 2 |x|#|y| is total.
It is known that the function Bit(x, i) which gives the value of the i th bit in the binary expansion of x, and the operation of length bounded counting are definable in S 1 2 . Hence the function count(a) = #i < |a|(Bit(a, i) = 1), which gives the number of 1's in the binary expansion of a, is well defined in S 1 2 . Now, let M be a countable (nonstandard) model of S 1 2 + Ω 2 + ¬exp. For a large element a ∈ M , structures of the form M = {x ∈ M : count(x) < ||a|| for some a ∈ M } were studied in [J2] .
Next we need to modify the definition of M (in order to prove our independence result).
Fix a large element a ∈ M and define M * = Log(M ) ∪ {x ∈ M : count(x) < ||a|| n for some non-negative integer n}.
Proof. First, note that Log(M ) is a model of BASIC (note that since we have assumed M is closed under Ω 2 , small elements are closed under #).
Moreover, as it is mentioned in [J1] , it can be proved in S Note that count(2 |a| ) = 1 and so 2 |a| ∈ M * . Consider the element b = 2 |a| − 1 ∈ M . Then count(b) = |a|. If b ∈ M * , then |a| < ||a|| n for some n ∈ N. As M Ω 2 , there is a ∈ M such that |a| < ||a || and so a < 2|a |, in contradiction to a being large.
Inductively define a #0 = 1, a #1 = a, and a #(n+1) = a #n #a, for each a ∈ M .
Theorem 3.3
There is an ω-chain of models of BASIC such that the union of its worlds satisfies S 1 2 but none of its worlds satisfies the sentence ∀x∃y(x = 0 ∨ x = y + 1). Moreover, for each i, M i+1 is a proper weak end-extension of M i . 2) M i+1 is defined as the set {x ∈ M : x < a #n i for some n ∈ N} ∪ {x ∈ M : count(x) < ||a i+1 || n for some n ∈ N}.
Proof. As above, let M be a countable (nonstandard) model of S
Similar proofs as the ones given for M * above can be applied to show that M i BASIC + ¬∀x∃y(x = 0 ∨ x = y + 1). Also, clearly,
Note that each world contains Log(M ), and so clearly M i+1 is a weak end-extension of M i . Moreover the extension is proper, since for example, (
Next we mention an easy fact about Kripke models (see [M1] ). Its proof is similar to the one for Proposition 2.1. A Kripke model is a weak end-extension Kripke model if its accessibly relation is a weak end-extension. The last two results suggest a way to construct a special Kripke model. Below, we will explicitly define and use it.
PIND on NP and coNP formulas
In this section our aim is to apply the models constructed above to show that the sentence ¬¬∀x∃y(x = 0∨x = y+1) is not intuitionistically provable in BASIC + PIND(Π b+ 1 ). A similar method is used in [M2] to show that
Each of these results, using ∀∃ conservatively of S Therefore, by the definition of forcing, K ¬∀x∃y(x = 0 ∨ x = y + 1). Hence,
On the other hand, since the union of the worlds in this Kripke model is equal to M S 1 2 , by Proposition 3.4, we have K PIND(Π b+ 1 ). Now, we are interested in the question of whether results analogous to the above hold if we work in the language of PV (recall that, by [M1] , IPV PIND(coNP) unless CPV = PV 1 ). This question is not easy. The following proposition gives a reason for this claim. By IS 2 (PV) we mean the intuitionistic version of S 2 conservatively extended to the language of PV. Proof. Let PV i P=NP. Then, using induction on the complexity of formulas, one can see that, any bounded formula in PV i would be equivalent to a quantifier free formula. We only examine the ∀ case:
, where ψ is quantifier-free. So, PV i ∀x tϕ(x, y) ↔ ∀x tψ(x, y). Using decidability of atomic formulas, we get the following intuitionistic equivalences:
∀x tψ(x, y) ≡ i ∀x t¬¬ψ(x, y) ≡ i ¬∃x t¬ψ(x, y). Now, using the assumption, we obtain that ∀x tψ(x, y) is equivalent to a quantifier free formula. To see PV i ≡ IS 2 (PV), note that PV 1 proves the polynomial induction on quantifier free formulas and so one can see that PV i does the same, using the negative translation.
So proving PV + PIND(coNP) i PIND(NP) would require proving that PV i P = NP.
In the theorem below, we give an answer to the above mentioned question under a plausible assumption.
Recall that, the (sharply bounded) replacement (or collection) scheme BB(
where A is a Σ b 0 formula and [x] i is the ith element of the sequence coded by x. It is known that CPV proves this scheme but, if integer factoring is not possible in probabilistic polynomial time, then PV 1 does not prove the scheme (see [CT] ). Also, if PV 1 + BB(Σ b 0 ) proves CPV, then PV 1 proves CPV (see [Z] and [CT] ). Also, let EF denote an extended Frege proof system. Recall that a Frege proof system is just an ordinary propositional proof system containing finitely many axiom schemes and inference rules, and an extended Frege proof system is a Frege system allowing abbreviations of the form p A ≡ A, where A is a propositional formula and p A is a new propositional variable. The system EF can be formalized in PV 1 and related results about it can be stated and proved in this theory (see [C] or [K] ). For example, it is known that provability of NP = coNP and that of the statement "EF is a complete proof system" in PV 1 are equivalent (see [K, Theorem 15.3.7] ). CPV, see [K, Theorem 7.6.3] for the existence of such a model. Note that the induced embedding between M and M * is not Σ b 1 -elementary. Putting M * above M produces a Kripke model which forces PV + PIND(coNP), see Proposition 2.1. We show that it does not force PIND(NP). Suppose the Kripke model forces PIND(NP). We will show that, in this case, the root, i.e. M , (classically) would satisfy PIND(NP) which is a contradiction.
We heavily rely on the easily verifiable fact that forcing and satisfaction of NP formulas in each node of a Kripke model of PV i are equivalent. formula is equivalent to an NP formula, see [Th] for more detail on this theory.
Let B(x) be an arbitrary NP formula. We are going to show that M satisfies the instance of polynomial induction on B(x). So, let M B(0) and M B( So, we get M ∀x(B(x) ∨ A) since the Kripke model forces PIND(NP) by our assumption. Hence, M ∀x(B(x) ∨ A). So, M ∀xB(x). Therefore, M PIND(NP), which is a contradiction.
